38 NORMATIVA DI PAOLO TATTOLI* E GIUSEPPE IOTTI** must necessarily be integrated. The new Regulation therefore makes collaboration throughout the supply chain even more important. NOT NEW RED TAPE, BUT A DEMONSTRATION OF SAFETY The risk assessment required by the new Regulation should not turn into a second round of design carried out after the fact, nor should it become a collection of documents bearing no relation to the solutions actually adopted. Its aim is to demonstrate, in a comprehensible and verifiable manner, the approach taken by the manufacturer: which hazards have been identified, which risks have been assessed and which measures have been adopted. For the lift sector, this means, above all, making the most of the technical expertise already available. The standards in the EN 81 series represent the result of decades of risk analysis and practical experience. Where they are available and applicable, they must remain the primary reference for design and for demonstrating safety. In the absence of a harmonised standard that fully covers the applicable requirements, the burden on the manufacturer increases, as they must directly demonstrate how the solutions adopted enable the required level of safety to be achieved. This is probably the real challenge for the coming months: not to turn risk assessment into a bureaucratic exercise reserved for a handful of specialists, but to make it a practical tool that can be used by the entire supply chain. The new Regulation requires the manufacturer to demonstrate that the machinery is safe. It does not require them to take the place of the standards-setting body. The more harmonised technical standards and shared solutions are available, the easier it will be for the manufacturer to fulfil this task effectively, consistently <and sustainably. * Lift expert ** Koppel A.W. general manager ations in which a person may find themselves in difficulty and the realistic means available to enable intervention in safe conditions. AUTOMATIC CONTROL OF THE MANOEUVRE – EHSR 6.2 Finally, requirement 6.2, relating to control devices, is of particular interest for lifting equipment. The Regulation sets out the conditions under which an automatic control may be used in place of a hold-to-run control. Here too, the choice cannot be purely formal: it must be demonstrated, through the risk assessment, that the automatic control does not introduce additional risks or that such risks are adequately controlled. A PARTICULAR ASPECT: WHEN THE CONTROL SYSTEM STOPS THE INSTALLATION The behaviour of the control system in the event of faults deserves particular attention. In machinery in general, bringing the system to a safe state often means stopping the movement. In lifts and platforms, the issue is more complex, as the machinery carries people. A stop may indeed be necessary to avoid a hazard, but it may simultaneously result in a person becoming trapped and give rise to further risks: fainting, attempts at self-rescue, improper interventions or difficulties in rescue operations. The risk assessment must therefore consider both the hazard that necessitates the stop and the consequences that the stop itself may produce. The concept of a ‘safe condition’ cannot be interpreted simply as ‘stopping everything as quickly as possible’. For each relevant scenario, it is necessary to identify the behaviour that minimises the overall risk, avoiding dangerous movements and untimely starts, whilst taking into account the need to allow for the safe rescue of trapped persons. This is an area in which the expertise of the plant manufacturer, the control system designer, the switchboard manufacturer and the software developer IN LIFTING EQUIPMENT, A SAFE CONDITION DOES NOT ALWAYS MEAN IMMEDIATE SHUTDOWN: THE CONSEQUENCES OF A STOPPAGE AND RESCUE PROCEDURES MUST ALSO BE INCLUDED IN THE ASSESSMENT
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